Saturday, May 15, 2010
The 55 percent Republic
The establishment of fixed-term Parliaments is a very very serious constitutional amendment for the UK.
It is right that this be tested out as vigorously as possible before legislation is introduced.
It will remove some of the most serious political powers supposedly still vested in the Royal Prerogative and hand them over to the elected representatives of the people of the UK. In a real sense it is a step towards a kind of Republic (with a Monarch as ceremonial head even more divorced from politics than now)..
The so-called prerogatives are, under the present constitutional understandings, actually manipulated by the Prime Minister of the day.
The fixed term, and the new exceptional dissolution powers suggested for Parliament, take powers away from the Prime Minister and for the first time vests them in the House.
There are all sorts of ramifications to this apparently simple step of fixing the Parliamentary term..
It is possible that those proposing this step have not yet sorted out all the consequences. It would be helpful if some of the distinguished lawyers friendly to the new coalition could provide an analysis of the knock-on effects so that our debates can be conducted in a calmer manner.
The proposers of this change will benefit from hearing constructive criticism and may well feel that some variations are needed in the final legislation.
Just by the way and as an example I think five years is too long for a fixed term and would be happy to argue this..
It is right that this be tested out as vigorously as possible before legislation is introduced.
It will remove some of the most serious political powers supposedly still vested in the Royal Prerogative and hand them over to the elected representatives of the people of the UK. In a real sense it is a step towards a kind of Republic (with a Monarch as ceremonial head even more divorced from politics than now)..
The so-called prerogatives are, under the present constitutional understandings, actually manipulated by the Prime Minister of the day.
The fixed term, and the new exceptional dissolution powers suggested for Parliament, take powers away from the Prime Minister and for the first time vests them in the House.
There are all sorts of ramifications to this apparently simple step of fixing the Parliamentary term..
It is possible that those proposing this step have not yet sorted out all the consequences. It would be helpful if some of the distinguished lawyers friendly to the new coalition could provide an analysis of the knock-on effects so that our debates can be conducted in a calmer manner.
The proposers of this change will benefit from hearing constructive criticism and may well feel that some variations are needed in the final legislation.
Just by the way and as an example I think five years is too long for a fixed term and would be happy to argue this..
Labels: constitution, Fixed term, Republic
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Monday, October 08, 2007
Is "Fixed Term Fixation" the best we can do?
The ‘Fixed Term Parliament’ idea seems to be the latest constitutional panacea that will cure all problems from constipation upwards. Sorry, but I think this misses a number of important points.
For starters the real problem behind the recent undignified ‘Dance of The Seven Gordons’ is that the UK has not really abolished arbitrary Royal Powers. They have just migrated to the ‘Prime Minister in Parliament’. Tackling this complex of arbitrary ‘Henry VIII powers’ is the real constitutional challenge, and making Parliamentary election cycles absolutely rigid may be a bit of a distraction.
Rigid fixed term Parliaments have their disadvantages – as can be seen today in the desperate scrabbling in the US political system to cope with a totally discredited but essentially non-removable fixed term executive.
I hope we can have a proper debate on a flexible constitutional structure for our Parliament rather than a simplistic outcry on fixed terms. I do have a couple of suggestions in the back of my mind which I will mull over.
(For the record I think that the US Constitution is a remarkable document with some historic successes in carrying the US through extreme crisis, but which has serious design flaws some of which present real threats to US political health. Changing this is almost impossible.)
For starters the real problem behind the recent undignified ‘Dance of The Seven Gordons’ is that the UK has not really abolished arbitrary Royal Powers. They have just migrated to the ‘Prime Minister in Parliament’. Tackling this complex of arbitrary ‘Henry VIII powers’ is the real constitutional challenge, and making Parliamentary election cycles absolutely rigid may be a bit of a distraction.
Rigid fixed term Parliaments have their disadvantages – as can be seen today in the desperate scrabbling in the US political system to cope with a totally discredited but essentially non-removable fixed term executive.
I hope we can have a proper debate on a flexible constitutional structure for our Parliament rather than a simplistic outcry on fixed terms. I do have a couple of suggestions in the back of my mind which I will mull over.
(For the record I think that the US Constitution is a remarkable document with some historic successes in carrying the US through extreme crisis, but which has serious design flaws some of which present real threats to US political health. Changing this is almost impossible.)
Labels: constitution, Elections, Fixed term, Parliament, United Kingdom, United States
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IMHO, the American problem is that there is a fixed-term Executive rather than a fixed-term Parliament
And a non-fixed term doesn't really help with a discredited parliament that still has a majority. The Tories were inevitably going to lose the election whenever they called it after Black Wednesday, but they held on to the last second, because their majority held up and because they could.
If you want a recall provision, then argue for a recall provision, but that has little to do with fixed-term or non-fixed-term parliaments.
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And a non-fixed term doesn't really help with a discredited parliament that still has a majority. The Tories were inevitably going to lose the election whenever they called it after Black Wednesday, but they held on to the last second, because their majority held up and because they could.
If you want a recall provision, then argue for a recall provision, but that has little to do with fixed-term or non-fixed-term parliaments.
Monday, July 02, 2007
A constitutional
The 'zippo lighter' attacks have obscured the preparations for Browns initiatives on the UK Constitution.
We put in our pre-emptative position on the constitution with Ming's statement on June 29th and the publication of our twenty-step programme for democratic renewal.
Over on the Our Kingdom blog which is spearheding debates on the constitution issues they comment that LibDem blogosphere discussion of this theme seem not to be visible and ask for any links.
We put in our pre-emptative position on the constitution with Ming's statement on June 29th and the publication of our twenty-step programme for democratic renewal.
Over on the Our Kingdom blog which is spearheding debates on the constitution issues they comment that LibDem blogosphere discussion of this theme seem not to be visible and ask for any links.
Labels: constitution
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Friday, June 29, 2007
A Presidency is born???
As we await the ‘Word From Gordon On High’ on ‘constitutional initiatives’ a thought on the possible road to a Presidency.
The constitutional convention in the UK is that Ministers of the Crown (however junior) have to be Members of Parliament, either of the Commons or the Lords. In the past when outsiders have been parachuted into government they were given peerages to regularise their positions.
This means that ministers have a certain connection to Party, and a political position separate from their ministerial office. They are also questionable by their own house.
In presidential systems (in the USA and in the French Hybrid) the Presidents are at liberty to appoint people to any post of any persuasion they chose – within the constraints of the power balance. In the USA it is almost conventional for a President of one party to appoint at least one cabinet minister affiliated to the other party.
In the flood of appointments to Team Gordon a number of non-parliamentarians have been tagged with posts entitled ‘Minister’ and so far nothing mentioned about entering the Lords or fighting by-elections. There has however been talk of alternative fora for accountability.
In many ways Blair ran a Presidency rather than a Premiership, and was only really constrained by the internal dynamics of Browns treasury kingdom. Brown will of course make sure that nothing so effective will challenge him in the Labour ministerial tribe. What are the constraints on him emphasising the Presidential trend in UK politics?
In all this ‘talent show’ recruitment are we seeing the final demise of Parliament in day to day politics ( rather on the lines of the London assembly in relation to the Mayor) or will there be a development of effective scrutiny over non-parliamentary ministers?
I think we need to keep very careful watch over this development.
The constitutional convention in the UK is that Ministers of the Crown (however junior) have to be Members of Parliament, either of the Commons or the Lords. In the past when outsiders have been parachuted into government they were given peerages to regularise their positions.
This means that ministers have a certain connection to Party, and a political position separate from their ministerial office. They are also questionable by their own house.
In presidential systems (in the USA and in the French Hybrid) the Presidents are at liberty to appoint people to any post of any persuasion they chose – within the constraints of the power balance. In the USA it is almost conventional for a President of one party to appoint at least one cabinet minister affiliated to the other party.
In the flood of appointments to Team Gordon a number of non-parliamentarians have been tagged with posts entitled ‘Minister’ and so far nothing mentioned about entering the Lords or fighting by-elections. There has however been talk of alternative fora for accountability.
In many ways Blair ran a Presidency rather than a Premiership, and was only really constrained by the internal dynamics of Browns treasury kingdom. Brown will of course make sure that nothing so effective will challenge him in the Labour ministerial tribe. What are the constraints on him emphasising the Presidential trend in UK politics?
In all this ‘talent show’ recruitment are we seeing the final demise of Parliament in day to day politics ( rather on the lines of the London assembly in relation to the Mayor) or will there be a development of effective scrutiny over non-parliamentary ministers?
I think we need to keep very careful watch over this development.
Labels: Brown, constitution, presidency
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