Thursday, February 05, 2009
The permanent threat from the USA on intelligence
Put simply, the US and UK intelligence organisations are so deeply interwined that the US is able to make an 'offer that cannot be refused' any time it likes.
UK intelligence operatives are routinely seconded to various entities in Langley to work on joint projects in those agencies. The UK electronic listening networks in effect act as subcontractors to the USA in specific intelligence markets.
It is not a matter just of exchanging information between separate sovereign organisations but of intricate joint intra-organisational data flows.
The national sovereigncy of the UK is substantially compromised by these arrangements because the US holds the keys to the main doors. The payoff for the UK is the ability to strut the world stage as a 'significant power' without the need to pay for all the intelligence infrastructure. Just so long as nobody really understands what is actually happening.
In my judgement the UK fell in with the Iraq war nonsense of the Bush administration because Bush was able to threaten withdrawal of these intelligence links if the UK did not comply with his policies. This would have led to the collapse of the Intelligence Illusion in Whitehall and the illusion is too central to the self-image of key parts of the UK secret state.
The current rapidly disintegrating cover-up of the torture networks is not the reason for the 'threat' to end intelligence co-operation - it has simply removed for a moment one of the veils hiding the reality of what exists and what can happen.
Even when the torture business is sorted out the latent threat will still exist as a part of the relationship between the US and the UK. Unless of course the UK decides to disentangle itself from this potentially abusive relationship. Which could be quite an abrasive and conflict-ridden process.
I have reasons through personal contacts some years ago to know about the existance of the intelligence tangle.
Labels: GCHQ, intelligence analysis, Torture
Sunday, December 21, 2008
The perils of 'good-enough' intelligence mis-analysis
Basically he looks at the way that intelligence analysts can be:
fooled into assembling the case that appears most likely rather than challenging the evidence to find out what is actually true … Equipped with vast technical resources, satellite imaging, hugely sophisticated listening devices and computer programmes to winnow the galaxies of data streams, the charge is that the spooks lost an equally powerful tool along the way: an old-fashioned and thoroughly applied inclination towards skeptical testing of all information.
Observer 8 February 2004
The blurb says:
Three fundamental points are at the heart of this presentation about the cognitive challenges intelligence analysts face: The mind is poorly 'wired' to deal effectively with both inherent uncertainty (the natural fog surrounding complex, indeterminate intelligence issues) and induced uncertainty (the man-made fog fabricated by denial and deception operations).Even increased awareness of cognitive and other 'unmotivated' biases, such as the tendency to see information confirming an already-held judgement more vividly than one sees 'disconfirming' information, does little by itself to help analysts deal effectively with uncertainty. Tools and techniques that gear the analyst's mind to apply higher levels of critical thinking can substantially improve analysis on complex issues on which information is incomplete, ambiguous, and often deliberately distorted.
Meanwhile back on the murders aftermath:
On Stagg and the murders actually committed by another, Scotland Yard said it had "no plans for a further review" of its handling of the investigation.
"Homicide investigations have changed significantly since 1992 and we've learnt from these reviews," a spokesman said.
Independent on Sunday 21 December 2008
I suspect a few more reviews might be helpful.
And maybe nearer home – should our own party policy and political analysis procedures take more account of the dangers of self-justifying groupthink?
For some entertaining reading on groupthink disasters (and a good laugh) try Norman Dixon’s book ‘On The Psychology of Military Incompetence’. Note though that some people may find the 'explenations' for the disasters as being due to inadequate potty training for the infant generals even more amusing than the hair raising military events in part one of the book, which include the occasion when a British army lined up with its back to the enemy, and within gunshot range.
Labels: groupthink, intelligence analysis, skepticism
