Friday, December 04, 2009
The Bonus fallacy and tournaments
Most people, I suppose, think of a ‘bonus’ as something extra. A pay ‘bonus’ in this definition means something earned by ‘defined exceptional circumstances’ – not something paid over as routine. So good work, increasing efficiency, improved customer satisfaction – all the might earn a bonus.
The ‘Financial Sector’ likes to claim that their ‘bonuses’ are just like this, a kind of posh term for ‘payment by results’ or ‘piecework rates’. This may be the kind of hot air that suggests the collective noun ‘a Wunch of Bankers’.
The reality may be the ‘Tournament System’ so ably described for lay readers in Tim Harfords book ‘ The logic of Life’. Specifically the chapter on ‘why your boss is overpaid’.
This is how I understand Harford’s argument.
Basically most jobs cannot easily be assessed by performance by results. And jobs that involve handling big flows of money are difficult to constrain in the public interest. So what happens is a pay system analogous to a top tennis tournament. The winner, the champion, the chair of the Board, is guaranteed a huge wad of cash. Second place wins much less but still a worthwhile consolation. The aim though is to inspire the twenty or so people in the immediate lower tiers to work their socks off in order to make the organisation work. They need to be guaranteed enough money not to be seduced into rival tournaments. In turn this premier league gives incentives for a strata of much less well paid potential contenders, the people who may actually create the wealth for the organisation if wealth creation is part of the deal.
It is actually irrelevant whether the people getting the top prizes are competent or even active in the organisation. All they have to do in this system is avoid doing conscious damage, and avoid distorting the company accounts too blatantly to make shareholders pay covertly for top corporate benefits.
But admitting that the pay structure is a kind of danegeld paid out to prevent other forms of legalised looting by corporate insiders would be highly embarrassing. So the term ‘bonuses’ has been conscripted to make the general public believe that some kind of payment by results is in place.
Trouble is that when huge losses are the financial order of the day, payment by results suggest no ‘bonus payments’, in the popular sense, should be made. But if you accept that the system is a tournament, it becomes unworkable without some element of obscene overpayments.
The RBS board (and others) are trying to maintain the ‘tournament system’ without actually admitting that is what they are doing. As I understand Harford, he also believes that an element of Tournament Economics’ is inevitable, so he does not suggest a solution.
Is Harford right? If so should we be bringing in the implications of ‘tournament economics’ into our political discourse?
The ‘Financial Sector’ likes to claim that their ‘bonuses’ are just like this, a kind of posh term for ‘payment by results’ or ‘piecework rates’. This may be the kind of hot air that suggests the collective noun ‘a Wunch of Bankers’.
The reality may be the ‘Tournament System’ so ably described for lay readers in Tim Harfords book ‘ The logic of Life’. Specifically the chapter on ‘why your boss is overpaid’.
This is how I understand Harford’s argument.
Basically most jobs cannot easily be assessed by performance by results. And jobs that involve handling big flows of money are difficult to constrain in the public interest. So what happens is a pay system analogous to a top tennis tournament. The winner, the champion, the chair of the Board, is guaranteed a huge wad of cash. Second place wins much less but still a worthwhile consolation. The aim though is to inspire the twenty or so people in the immediate lower tiers to work their socks off in order to make the organisation work. They need to be guaranteed enough money not to be seduced into rival tournaments. In turn this premier league gives incentives for a strata of much less well paid potential contenders, the people who may actually create the wealth for the organisation if wealth creation is part of the deal.
It is actually irrelevant whether the people getting the top prizes are competent or even active in the organisation. All they have to do in this system is avoid doing conscious damage, and avoid distorting the company accounts too blatantly to make shareholders pay covertly for top corporate benefits.
But admitting that the pay structure is a kind of danegeld paid out to prevent other forms of legalised looting by corporate insiders would be highly embarrassing. So the term ‘bonuses’ has been conscripted to make the general public believe that some kind of payment by results is in place.
Trouble is that when huge losses are the financial order of the day, payment by results suggest no ‘bonus payments’, in the popular sense, should be made. But if you accept that the system is a tournament, it becomes unworkable without some element of obscene overpayments.
The RBS board (and others) are trying to maintain the ‘tournament system’ without actually admitting that is what they are doing. As I understand Harford, he also believes that an element of Tournament Economics’ is inevitable, so he does not suggest a solution.
Is Harford right? If so should we be bringing in the implications of ‘tournament economics’ into our political discourse?
Labels: banks, bonuses, economic crash, economics, Financial markets, financial services, recession, tournements
Comments:
My father and mother are both bank employees, this is useful information for us about bonus and pay scales, i am here to find out some information about bank jobs, but this type of information we will get it very rare. Keep posting the new updates thank you.
Reshma M,
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Reshma M,
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Friday, March 27, 2009
Will The Storm be even wilder than we think?
My Amazon account flags me that Vince Cable’s book ‘The Storm’ will be delivered to me on or about 6 April. Pre-ordered in January… So not long to go before we all can get Vince’s thoughts in detail.
Meanwhile this article in the current edition of the ‘Atlantic Monthly’ looks of interest. The summary says:
The authors draw on their IMF experience and present a damning indictment. The United States (and some other countries?) fell into the hands of the kind of oligarchy that wrecked the emerging economies.
What are the politics faced by the IMF in their efforts to sort out tanking economies in countries such as Argentina and Russia?
When the crash comes these oligarchies act to protect their own interests even though this means disaster for the economies they meddle with. And in the past decades a similar oligarchy acting under the same motives captured the USA and still has the power to do a similar wrecking job.
The authors solution includes a ruthless restructuring of the financial market structure, including the breaking up of the megabanks, and the restoration of a more sober ‘utility’ basic banking sector. Now I wonder where we have heard that before.
The author’s conclusion is:
Indeed. Mind you some people are not entirely impressed with the ‘not very hard to work out’ economics underlying the IMF approach so may be a bit sceptical about some of Johnson’s other recommendations.
The ‘Atlantic’ article is by Simon Johnson and James Kwak. Johnson is a former chief economist of the IMF and is a professor at MIT Sloane School of Management. He runs the baselinescenario.com blog
Meanwhile this article in the current edition of the ‘Atlantic Monthly’ looks of interest. The summary says:
The crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.
The authors draw on their IMF experience and present a damning indictment. The United States (and some other countries?) fell into the hands of the kind of oligarchy that wrecked the emerging economies.
What are the politics faced by the IMF in their efforts to sort out tanking economies in countries such as Argentina and Russia?
….to IMF officials … the economic solution is seldom very hard to work out.
No, the real concern of the fund’s senior staff, and the biggest obstacle to recovery, is almost invariably the politics of countries in crisis.
Typically, these countries are in a desperate economic situation for one simple reason—the powerful elites within them overreached in good times and took too many risks. Emerging-market governments and their private-sector allies commonly form a tight-knit—and, most of the time, genteel—oligarchy, running the country rather like a profit-seeking company in which they are the controlling shareholders. When a country like Indonesia or South Korea or Russia grows, so do the ambitions of its captains of industry. As masters of their mini-universe, these people make some investments that clearly benefit the broader economy, but they also start making bigger and riskier bets. They reckon—correctly, in most cases—that their political connections will allow them to push onto the government any substantial problems that arise.
When the crash comes these oligarchies act to protect their own interests even though this means disaster for the economies they meddle with. And in the past decades a similar oligarchy acting under the same motives captured the USA and still has the power to do a similar wrecking job.
The authors solution includes a ruthless restructuring of the financial market structure, including the breaking up of the megabanks, and the restoration of a more sober ‘utility’ basic banking sector. Now I wonder where we have heard that before.
The author’s conclusion is:
The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump “cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.” This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression—because the world is now so much more interconnected and because the banking sector is now so big. We face a synchronized downturn in almost all countries, a weakening of confidence among individuals and firms, and major problems for government finances. If our leadership wakes up to the potential consequences, we may yet see dramatic action on the banking system and a breaking of the old elite. Let us hope it is not then too late.
Indeed. Mind you some people are not entirely impressed with the ‘not very hard to work out’ economics underlying the IMF approach so may be a bit sceptical about some of Johnson’s other recommendations.
The ‘Atlantic’ article is by Simon Johnson and James Kwak. Johnson is a former chief economist of the IMF and is a professor at MIT Sloane School of Management. He runs the baselinescenario.com blog
Labels: Atlantic Monthly, economic crash, IMF, oligarchy, Vince Cable
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